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I . INTRODUCTI ON 
One of the central themes in economics f o r about two 
centuries has been to compute a general equilibrium p r ice . 
The gene ral equilibrium model was fi r st formulated by 
Walras (29) , whose law says that if one market at a Walrasian 
p r ice vector shows excess dema nd (supp ly) , then at least one 
of the othe r markets must exhibit excess supply (demand) : in 
othe r wo rds , the summation of the value of the excess demands 
equals zero . Along with this concept , gene ral equilibrium 
for a competitive economy can be defined as a p r ice vector, 
the elements of which are the prices of outputs and inputs , 
such that all markets clea r at once . The gene r al equilibrium 
theory , by utilizing Walras ' law and the Pareto optimality , 
takes account of the interaction of the economic agents 
through markets (4) . 
Wald (28) was the first to prove the existence of the 
Walrasian equilibrium. Under the assumption that an 
individual ' s demand for a commodity would rise if the price oE 
any othe r commodity were to increase , he demonstrated the 
existence and uniqueness of a vector of competitive 
equilibrium prices. 
J . v o n Neumann (271 developed a mathematical tool playing 
an essential role in equilibrium theory under the definitive 
form as a Brouwer ' s fixed point theorem , the value of whose 
tool was powerful enough to show the existence of Nash (141 or 
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Cournot [3] equilibrium. 
McKenzie [13] and Arrow and Debreu [l] showed the proof of 
existence in more general treatments. Debreu [4] and Arrow 
and Hahn (2] made use of convexity and topological properties 
in treating the general equilibrium model. 
~oopmans (10] , meanwhile, showed that an optimum is 
equivalent to an equilibrium relative to a price vector: if 
nondistortionary transfers exist, a competitive equilibrium is 
Pareto efficientand essentially every Pareto efficient 
allocation can be supported as a competitive equilibrium. 
Since the formulation of the Walrasian general 
equilibrium structure in the form o f an abstract economy by 
~rrow, Debreu , and othe r s such as the above cited, many 
economists , in the last few yea rs, have developed the so-
ca 11 ed "Applied Gene ral Equilibrium Analysis" (AGEN 
hoping to transform a general Walrasian model into realisti c 
models of actual economies. Using thi s model makes it 
possible to evaluate policy options by specifying production 
and demand parameters reflecting the data of real economies . 
When calculating empirical estimates of the effects of 
economic distortions from the perfectly competitive model, the 
applied general equilibrium models offe r a g reat deal of added 
generality and flexibility ove r previous methods , the typical 
model of which is t he two sec tor-two factor of production 
general equilibrium model deve l oped by Meade (12] and Johnson 
(7] . Under the category of this basic model, several studies, 
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for example , done by Har be r ge r [~ l and Johnson and Mie szkows ~ i 
[8], have been presented which compare the economy with and 
witho ut the relevant dist o rti on of taxes, t a rif.fs , or o the r 
policies. Although Harberger provided a theo r et i ca l wo rk for 
anal yz ing th e effects of th e corporate income tax and d r ew 
some inferences about the probable incidence o f the tax , thi s 
s o rt o f approach has fac ed t he following crit i cisms [21 , ~'.l : 
1) it is so based o n the l oc al analys is that it is not well-
suite d for the analysi s of t l-te h i gher r ate tax (e.g ., 5"1%) 
distortion. 2) aggregating the sectors o r factors into two i s 
t oo severe. 3) it i s not re a li s tic to assume the fixe r'! fa c t o r 
endowments , and 4) analyzing one di stortion at a time can be 
mi sleading . 
A compute r al go rithm fo r calcula ting gener a l equil i b rium 
prices originally developed by Sca r f [ 17 , 181 has been a very 
i mportant s timulus t o overco me the a bov e shortcomi ngs . Mo w 
that the gene r al equili b rium model , when cast in a 
mathematical f o rm, beco me a comp lex sys tem o f s imult~ neo us 
equations and inequalities f o r the de terminati o n of all pri ces 
an d output levels in the eco nomy , t he existence of a solu ti on 
can be guaranteed o nly by making use of what a r e kn o wn as 
" fixed point" t heo r ems , whi c h desc ri be co nd i t i o ns under whi ch 
a continuous mapping l eaves at least o ne point unchanged [17 ; 
p. 21 0] . Sca rf ' s algor i th m [l t; , 17 , 181 ha s p r o vided a 
general method f o r the expl icit numerical so luti on of the 
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neoclassical model. 
Shoven and Whalley's works [20 , 24) , based on Scarf 's 
algorithm , demonstrated a proof of the existence of a 
competitive equilibrium for an economy with producer and 
consumer commodity taxes, and developed a computational 
procedure for the determination of the equilibrium with the 
taxes being considered. In their model, the government is 
assumed to be a tax collecting and revenue dispersing agency. 
Although Scarf , Shoven, Whalley, and othe rs calculated 
general equilibrium prices with and without taxes by using the 
Scarf-type algorithm and by turning the abstract economy into 
a more realisti c one , thei r method so far did not have full 
rationality for usefulness in actual economies because they 
conducted the demonstration in terms of primitive sets as seen 
at the next section. 
This complaint, however, became much less valid after 
Merrill refined the Scarf ' s algorithm. The Merrill's fixed 
point algorithm solves the simultaneous highly-nonlinear 
equations, finding a general equil i brium price vector. 
Shoven and Whalley [23] , using the Merrill's algorithm 
with the Arrow and Hahn's model [2] , employed the two secto r-
two factor-two consumer model to compute general equilibrium 
prices . The equilibrium conditions in this model are 
basically equivalent to the four equation model ' s [2Sl : 
market demand equals market supply fo r all inputs and outputs 
and profits are zero in each industry. 
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These cond i tions produce six equations reduced t o fou r 
with four unknowns. The equilibrium price vector of these 
simultaneous equations are solved by the Merrill ' s algorithm 
if the parameters of production and consumption functions were 
specified and the exogenous variables known. Tt is out of a 
question to compute a general equilibrium price vecto r with 
one tax o r more taxes if we ad rl one more cond ition that the 
transfer payments to consume rs equal the tax revenue collected 
by the governmen t, which i s consi rle red as a consumer . 
Policy app r aisal determining if a particular policy 
change is welfare-improving usually relies upon a comparjso n 
be tween a no-tax equilibrium and a tax equ ilibrium. Numerical 
measu res of the gain or loss widely emp l oyen a re Hicksian 
compensating (CV) and equivalent (EV) variations associated 
with the equilibrium compa ri son . Welfare costs oE tAxes for 
the economy as a whole are measured by aggregati n g t he cvs or 
Evs across individuals [9]. 
In the review of previous works , I intro~uce t~e Scarf ' s 
algorithm and Shoven and Whal l ey ' s four equation mod el. These 
two works will well-represent the developments of the AGEA and 
show, with other works , that the AGEA p r ovines t he va lid 
evaluation of policy options in a real world. 
I modify the AG EA mode 1 by Sho ven and Wha 11 ey [ 25 J by 
all ow i ng labo r supply to be endogenous and by adding one more 
class of consume r s . I consider three kinds of fact o r taxes: 
1) tax on a factor in one industry only, 2) tax on a factor in 
both industries, and 3) tax on both factors in both 
industries. 
By using the up-dated method of the AGEA , I calculate the 
equilibrium price with and without taxes in the Walrasin 
general economy , then evaluate the welfare loss o r g ain among 
three consumers. Whether any policy change ca n generate a 
Pareto superio r equilibrium is discussed . 
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II. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS WORKS 
Sca r f's algorithm [1'1, 17, 181 , along with Hansen's [51 , 
has provided a general method for the explicit numerical 
solution of the neoclassical model. For the working of the 
algorithm , market dema nd functions a re assumed to satisfy 
Walras ' law: 
commodity , Xi is the market demand for the commodity i , and Wi 
is the total initial endowments of the commodity i . x · is a 1 
sum of individual ' s demand functions (L:xij) , each of which is 
derived from maximizing the individual ' s utility function 
subject to the budget constraint , while Wi= L:wij ' where wij is 
the initial endowment of the i-th commodity to individual j. 
Pr oduction is described by an arbitrary activity analysis 
matrix labelled "An* m" (m>n) . Each column of the A matrix 
refers to a feasible activity , the first n columns (negative 
n*n identity matrix) indicating free disposibility. An a· · l] 
(an element of the A matrix) is positive for an output an0 
negative for an input . 
A competitive equ i librium i s defined by a price vecto r, 
p* , and a vector o f activity levels, y* , such that 
1. demand equals supply in each market 
* * . Xi ( P ) =W i + L: a i j y j , i = 1 , • • • , n 
2 . p rofit is no better than the break even 
l:Piaij<=0 for all j, with equality if Yj*>0 
To find a p* and associated y* which approximately meet 
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the above two conditions , the Bn*k matrix (n<k<=m) is c reated 
from the A matrix by the specific rul es so as to satisfy the 
t heo rem : there exist s a primitive set , pjl, pjn, so that 
the columns , jl , •• • , jn , form a feasible basis for By=W. 
Such primitive set , which is an n*n price matrix , approximates 
a competitive equilibrium price . The usefulness of the 
algorithm i s du e t o the fact that it allows a computer t o 
rapidly find a p r imitive set which app r oximates a compet itive 
equ ilibrium rapidly. 
Shoven and Whalley (2~ , 22 , 24] and Shoven r21] added a 
tax system to the Scarf ' s algor ithm to compute an equilibrium 
price with prod ucer and/or consumer commodity taxes . All 
government revenue is dist r ibuted to consumers as transfe r 
payments , which affect a co nsumer's budget constraint. 
The market demand functions , which depend on the n 
commodity prices (P 1 , ••• , Pn) and the tax r 2v enue (R) , 
satisfy the Walras ' law ( L PiXi(l?,R) = L: PiWi + R) . 
One cha nge to the Scarf 's A matrix is to ad d one mo r e r ow. 
Thus, the last row of each co lumn of the A matrix becomes the 
tax revenue (rj) from the corresponding column , where r j = 
l::Pitijaij (tij is the ad valorem tax rates) . An equilibrium 
. * price vect o r , P =(P 1 , •. • , Pn , R) , and nonnegative activity 
* levels , y , sat isfy the two equilibrium conditions : 1) supply 
is equal t o demand for each commodity, and 2) aft e r-tax profit 
is maximized at the price vector , p*. At the above two 
conditions with the Walras ' law , it was shown that the revenu e 
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distributed among consumers was same as that generated on the 
production and/or consumption s i de . 
Shoven and Whalley not only showed the proof of the 
existence of an equilibrium p ri ce with the p r oducer and/or 
consume r taxes by modifying the Scarf ' s algorithm , but also 
c al c ul ated the efficiency loss and the incidence effects of a 
d iffe rential taxati on by comparing the equilibria in both the 
p r esence a nd t he absence of the su r tax. 
Har be rger [~l , meanwhi l e , introduced in the ' fi0s a 
gene ral equilibrium model of taxati on to examine the 
inte ri ndustry dis t ortion from the corporate income tax by the 
way of the differential calculus. He classified industries 
i nto the corpo r ate (heavily t axed) and non- corpo rate (lightly 
taxed) sectors according to the U.S. taxation of capital 
income du r ing 1953-59 . Each sector produced a single output 
in perfect competition using homogeneous and perfectly mobile 
labor and capital , available fixed aggregate supplies. He 
assumed there was one consumer , thereby rep r esenting consumer 
p r eferences as iden tical and homothetic . 
In equilibrium, his solution was obta ined by total 
differentiation , so that th e model was valid o nly for small 
changes in the tax rate . The results on the burden of the 
co r porate income tax depended in part on the substitutability 
of labor and cap ital in production . He concluded that 
capital i sts bea r the full burden of the co r porate income tax 
l~ 
when a 50% tax on capital income in one secto r was levied . 
Shoven ' s recomputati on of Harberger ' s two sector-two 
factor model employing the above algorithm , did not differ 
much from the corrected Harberger ' s results (211 . However , 
the algorithmic method took advantages of disaggregating the 
model into the 12 sectors . The dead weight loss estimates 
increased an average of about 40% from that of the two - sector 
model , giving valuable information for the making of policy 
dec i sions . 
Piggot and Whalley (15] presented the impact of 1973 
changes in the United Kingdom by making use of the above 
method of simultaneously incorporating several tax 
distortions . They employed a 33-product and l~~ -householn 
type model to evaluate structu ral characteristics of the 
U. K.' s tax /subsidy system with CES utility and production 
functions . They concluded that the existing U. t< . tax system 
yielded a distorting loss of 6- 9% of NNP per yea r, that 
subsidies to local authority housing area were a significant 
source of welfare loss , and that there exist ed significant 
redistributive effects of taxes in the U. l{ . tax/subsidy 
system . 
Serra-Puche (lQ] , employing the algorithmic method , 
analyzed tax incidence by replacing indirect turnover taxes 
with consumption value-added taxes as was instituted in Mexico 
in 1981 . He disaggregated the dema nd side into l~ consume r 
groups, the government , and the foreign sector; the production 
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side into 14 industries , and assumed the r e were Cobb- Douglas 
u t ility and production functions . He concluded that the 
pol i cy change caused resource allocation to move in favor of 
the go v e rnmen t t a r get secto r s , s uch as ag ri c ul t ur e a nd food 
s t uffs , and the income distribution " imp r oved ," reducing 
di f ferentials between urban and rural households . 
As seen from the previous works , some of the advantages 
o f t h e AGEA a r e as follows : 
1 . no l ocalization assumptions are r equire0 . 
2. it is simple to incorporate many commodities and 
cl asses of consumers . 
3 . the effect of seve r al simultaneo us distortions 
can be analyzed by using the empirical data . 
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IIT . OBJECTIVES 
The Scarf- type computer algorithm has p r ovided an 
excellent t ool to solve the highly nonlinear equations yielded 
by ge ne r a l equilibrium analysis. By using it , the AGEA went 
beyond traditional two - sector general equilib r ium models , 
thereby allowing for much mo re detail and complexity. 
My major objective in this paper is t o empl oy AGEA to 
compute gene r al equilibrium pr ices with and without a tax for 
the hypothetical two - sector, three-consumer model . I modify 
the Shaven and Whal ley' s example [ 23] to al low labor- leisure 
choices . Also , I compare pre-, and post-tax equilibria to see 
who ga ins , o r loses f rom the tax programs being considered . 
The Hicksian compensating (CV) and equivalent (EV) variations 
are also computed to facilitate this comparison. 
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IV . THE MODELS AND RESULTS 
A. Assumptions 
Taking some assumptions from traditional microeconomic 
theories in this paper, I employ the Arrow and Hahn ' s model 
[2] , which is commonly used for the AGEA. 
The number of consumers is specified . Each of them has 
initial endowments of then commodities and a set of 
p refe r ences, which generate an individual demand function for 
each commodity . Each demand functi on depends o n all prices in 
the no - tax system (the tax revenue is a d ded in the tax model) , 
are continuous , nonnegative , homogeneous of deg ree zero in all 
prices , and satisfy Walras ' law. Since market demands are 
simply a sum of each consumer's demands , the characteristics 
of market demands are the same as the above individual demand 
function ' s . 
On the production side , technology exhihits constant 
retu r ns to scale (CRS) , and producers maximize p r of its (this 
implies that p r oducers always satisfy the cost minimization) . 
The factor demand functions are de rived from the cos t 
minimization. The pr ope rties of the minimizing cost function 
a r e that it is non - decreasing , homogeneous of degree zero , and 
concave in factor prices , and separable into the output and a 
function of fac t or prices if the prod uction function exhibits 
homotheticity . For the CRS case , the cost function shoul d 
exhibit costs that are linear in the level of output : TC= 
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Q*M( R) , wher e TC is a cost function, Q is output , and M(R) is 
a function of a price vector of factors . Inputs are perfectly 
mobile and homogene o us , and outputs are homogeneous . 
In competitive equi li brium , a price vecto r and level of 
production in each industry satisfy the following conditions : 
1 . market demand equals supply in inputs. 
2 . mark et demand equals supply in outputs . 
3. zero profit c onditi o ns hold in industries in case of 
CRS . 
B. No-Tax Equilibrium and Results 
By following Arrow and Ha hn ' s model and employing 
traditional mic r oeconomic theories , I conside r a model with 
two final goods (manufacturing and nonmanufacturing) , two 
factors of pr oduction (capital and labor) , and three classes 
of consumers (the rich, the middle , and the poo r ) . Consumers 
have initial endowments of capital , some units of which are 
owned by the rich , the middle , and the poor . Labor is 
supplied by the labor-leisure choice among consumers . 
Production of each good is r epresented by a CRS constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) p r oducti o n function and each 
consumer class has a demand function derived from maximizing a 
CES utility function subject t o his or her budget constraint . 
Si nce the CES function is quasi - concave , the demand function 
for the input and output has the cha r acteristics cited i n the 
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previous section. 
The production functions are given by 
(l) Qi = a i [ biLi(ci-1)/ci + (l - bi)Ki(ci-1) /c i] ci/(ci - 1) , 
where 
i: 1 and 2 (1: manufacturing, 2 : n o nmanufacturing) , 
Qi : output of the i-th industry , 
ai: scale o r units par ame ters , 
b i : distribution parameters, 
Ki : capital inputs employed by the industry i , 
Li : labo r inputs employed by the industry i , and 
ci : elasticity of factor substitution . 
By the first- o rde r conditions of the cost mini mization, we 
have 
Ki 1 - bi PW ci 
( 2) = (-;;1- ~~) Li 
where 
PW: price of labo r , and 
Pk : pri ce of capital. 
f( i 
( 3) k i = will be defined as the capital intensity. 
Li 
Fr o m (1) and ( 2) ' the factor demand functions become 
1 b i ~~) (1-ci) ( 4) Li = Qi[bi + (!-bi) (---- ] ci/(1- ci) 
ai 1-bi PW 
1 <i 
l 1-bi PW ( l-c i ) 
(S) Ki= Qi [b i (---- --) + (1 - bi) ] ci/(1 - ci) 
ai bi Pk 
Meanwhile, the t o tal cos t functions of each secto r become 
Ki Pk 
( n) TC i = P wL i [ l + - -
( 7) 
Li PW 
Plugging (2) and (4) into (11) gives 
1 
TCi = 
ai 
Qi (b i ) c i I ( 1-c i ) ( Pw (1 - c i ) 
1 - bi ci 
+ (-;i-) Pk(l - ci )] 1/(1- ci) 
The above cost functions (7) show thei r separa b i lity 
representing the cha r acte risti cs o f the CRS CES producti on 
function . By the definition o f the de r ivati ve of TCi with 
respect t o Qi as th e margi nal cost (MC) , which is equal to t he 
pri ce of its ou tput in a pe rfectly competitive market , 
1 
(bi)ci / (1 - c i) [Pw(l - ci) (8) Pi = 
ai 
1-bi ci 
+(-bi-) Pk(l - ci )] 1/( 1- ci) 
Si n ce MC of an industry sh o wing CRS is always equal to the 
p rice o f its o utput fo r positive production , the pro fit is 
zero . Thus , the equati o n (8) i s equivalent t o the zero p r ofi t 
c ondition. 
The CES utility functions are given by 
( 9) uj = [a ljl / sj Xl j (sj -1 )/sj + a 2 j1/sj x2 j (sj - 1) / sj 
+ a3jl/sj Rj( sj-1 )/sj 1 sj /( sj - 1 ) 
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whe r e 
j : 1 (the rich) , 2 (the middle) , and 3 (the poor) , 
alj + a2j + a3j = 1 , 
Uj : utility of the i-th consumer 
Xlj , X2j: quantity of the good 1 and 2 oemanded by 
the j-th cons umer , 
Rj: leisure hour of the consumer j , 
alj , a 2 j, a3j: share parameters, and 
s j: elasticity of substitution . 
The budget constraint of t he consumer j is 
( 10) Ej = PkWkj + PwWlj => PlXlj + P2X2 j , 
wher e 
Ej : earned income of the consumer j , 
Wkj : capital e ndowment t o the consumer j I 
Wl j : labo r ho ur supplied by the consumer j , and 
Pl , P2 : consumer prices of the manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing o utput . 
Since Rj + Wlj = 24 , (10) becomes 
(11) Ij = PkWkj + 24Pw => PlXlj + P2X2j + PwRj 
In (11) I j is interpreted as the full income of the 
consumer j . 
By the first-o r de r conditions of the utility maximization 
subject to the budget constraint (11) , 
a2j Pl sj 
(12) X2j = - - -:-(-- ) Xlj , and 
alJ P2 
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a3j Pl sj 
(13) Rj = --~(--) Xlj 
alJ PW 
Substituting (1 /. ) and (13) into (11) gives the following 
demand functions and leisure dema nd functions : 
alj Ij 
Xlj = 
Plsj Dj 
( 14) 
a2j Ij 
(15) X2j = I and p~Sj Dj 
a3j Ij 
Rj = 
Pwsj Dj 
(l '5) 
where 
Dj = aljPl(l - sj) + a2jP2(1-sj) + a3jPw(l-sj ) and 
Ij = PkWkj + 24Pw • 
In this model , there a r e fifteen parameters whose values 
need to be specified : six p r oduction function parameters 
affecting the supply of two products (ai , bi , and ci for i=l , 
2) and nine utility function parameters which dete r mine the 
demand for each of two pr od ucts by each of three consumers 
(alj , a2j , and sj for j=l , 2 , 3) . There are three exogenous 
var iable s whose values must also be specified : the endowments 
of capit a l (Wkl , Wk2 , and Wk3). 
The solut i on t o this model is characterized by 17 
variables , the four prices , Pl , P2 , Pw , and Pk , nine demand 
quantities, Xll , X21 , Rl , Xl2 , X22 , R2 , Xl3 , X/.3 , and Rl , two 
labor inputs , Ll and L2 , and two capital intensities , kl and 
k2 . 
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The equilibrium conditions in this model are facto r ma rke t 
clea r ing, output ma rket clearing , and zero profits: 
1 . factor market c l ea ring 
(17) Ll + L2 = 72 - Rl - R2 - R3 
(18) klLl + k 2 L2 = k (k is t he t otal market endowment) , 
wh e re Ll , L2 , kl, and k2 are g iven by (3) and ( 4) , 
2 . o utput ma r ket clearing 
(19) Xll + Xl 2 + Xl3 = Ql 
(2 0) X21 + X22 + X23 = Q2 , whe r e Xlj and X2j a re giv en by 
(14) and (15) , and Qi are given by (1) , 
3 . zer o pro fit 
( 21) 
1 
Pl = --( b l )cl/ (1-cl) [Pw(l - cl) 
al 
1-b l cl +(---- ) Pk(l - cl)] 1/(1- cl) 
b l 
( 22) 
1 
P 2 = - - (b2)c2/(l-c2) [Pw(l-c 2) 
a2 
where these equations are from (8) . 
Once t he parameters of t hese production and demand 
functions are specif ied and the cap i tal endowments are known , 
a so lution to sa ti sfy the s imultaneous highly- nonlinea r 
equations (17) - ( 22) above is ob tained . 
Putting nume ri cal values fo r al l the parameters and the 
exoge n o us va riables in Table 1 below , I solved the equations 
using a compute r package named TK! So lver . 
2" 
What I have to note in this specification is that the 
curvature of the isoquant of the sector 1 is more rapid than 
Table 1. Specif icati on of the Paramete rs of the Production 
and Demand Functions and Endowments 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Secto r Production Parameters 
ai bi ci 
Manufacturing 1. 5 • i:; 2 . Cl! 
Nonmanufactu ring 2 . 0 . 7 . 5 
Demand Parameters Capital 
alj a2j a 3j sj Endowments 
The Rich • 2 • 2 . 6 2 4 C) 
The Middle • 3 • 2 . s 1.1 5 20 
The Poor • 3 . 3 • 4 . 9 5 
that o f the sector 2 because of the size of the value of the 
elasticity of factor substitution (ci) of both sectors , and 
that every consume r prefers enjoying leisure to consuming 
othe r goods , while the elastici t y of substitution (sj) of each 
consumer d if fe r s much f r om each othe r . 
The equilib rium solution with the labor price as 
numeraire is shown in Table ?. . As seen from Table ?. , at the 
equilibrium p ri ces , total demand for each output exactly 
matches the amount produced , and producer revenues equal 
consumer expenditures . Labo r supplied by the labor-leisure 
21 
choice and capital endowments are fully employed , and consumer 
factor incomes equal producer factor costs . Because of the 
Table 2. Equilib r ium Solution for the No - tax General 
Equi librium model 
(M : Manufacturing , N: Nonmanufacturing) 
Equilibrium Prices 
Pl= . 753 P2 = . '14A Pk = . 30'1 PW = l . 0rl0 
Production 
M 
N 
Total 
M 
N 
Total 
Demands 
The Rich 
The Middle 
The Poo r 
Total 
The Rich 
The Middle 
The Poor 
Total 
Capital 
Quantity Revenue Capital Cost 
33 . '131 25 . 30!9 49 . 381 15 . Ci1?4 
3~.4~8 23 . h46 20 . t:ll9 h . 273 
48 . 955 7f1 . <ilCrn 21 . 297 
Labor Tota l Pe r-unit Capital 
Labor Cost Cost Cost Intensity 
10 . 285 l~ . 285 25 . 309 . 753 4 . RO!l 
17 . 373 17 . 373 21 . '14h . (:)il'=l 1 . 18 7 
27 . 658 27 . h58 48 . q55 
Ex pen- Labo r 
M N diture Hours 
ll . 3'3t; 15 . 2'19 18 . 43? 4 . 7 ii l 
12 . 193 9 . h47 15 . 431 9 . )4'1 
10 . 102 11 . 552 15 . ~Q2 13 . 571 
33 . '131 3(:) . 41;8 4R . 955 ?.7 . t;5A 
Labor Capital Tota 1 
Income Income Income Utility 
4 . 741 13 . '191 18 . 432 !J.'1 . 2 r:..7 
9 . 346 '1 . 085 15 . 431 35 . 81,:; 
13 . 571 1 . 521 15 . f'l9?. 11. 59 7 
27 . 658 21 . 297 48 . 955 
--------------------------------------------------------------
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assumption of CRS in production , the per - unit cost in each 
industry equals the selling price , meaning that economic 
profits are zero . Utility is the numerical value of the 
utility function (9) , whic h is same as that of indirect 
utility, which will play an important role when calculating 
cvs and EVs . Since only relative prices affect behavior in 
general equilibrium models, I have chosen labor as numeraire . 
c . Gene ral Equilibrium with Taxes and Results 
The interdependence of demands and supplies , and tax 
revenues should be considered when taxes are being 
inco r porated into this model. For a given tax program (that 
is, for a specified tax rate imposed on a pa rticular ou tput o r 
facto r ) , tax revenues will be determined onc e demands, 
production levels , and factor employments are known . Also , 
demands depends on tax proceeds since these are redistributed 
to consumers , shifting individual budget const raints. The 
solution, thus , will be not on ly for equilibri um prices , but 
also for equilibrium tax revenues. In this model with taxes, 
I assume all go vernment rev e nues are redistributed to 
consumers : tax revenues collected by government equal the 
transfer payments to consumers , shares of which sum to unity. 
When ad valorem taxes are levied on factors , production 
possibility frontiers are changed , as are the equilibrium 
marginal rate of technical substitution to the extent that 
taxes are levied of factors according to where they are 
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employed . 
Let tkl , tll , tk2 , a nd tl2 denote ad valorem tax rates 
levied o n capital and labor used in sector 1 and sect o r 2 , 
respectively. Then , without changing the prices of labo r and 
capita l involved in demand functions (because consume r s 
r eceive t he net- of - tax pri ces) , t hose in production functions 
are slightly modified f r om the no - tax model: Pk and Pw in 
each sector become (l+tkl)Pk and (l+tll)Pw in secto r 1 , and 
(l +tk2)Pk and (l+tl 2)Pw in sec tor 2. Tax revenues de r ived 
from these taxes , denoted as Tl , T2 , T3 , and T4 , respective ly , 
wi ll be the multiplication o f t he tax r a te , price o f the 
facto r, an d the amount of the fact o r employed . It can be 
shown arithmetically as f ol lows : Tl=tkl* Pk* Kl , T/.=Tll *Pw*Ll , 
T3=tk2 * Pk * K2 , and T4=tl 2* Pw*L2 . Thus , th e total tax revenue , 
T , is the sum of Tl , T2 , T3 , an d T4 . 
One also needs to specify how tax revenue is 
r edis t ributed to consumers ; I assume the r e venue is 
redistributed evenl y to the consume r groups , s o each consume r 
receives T/ 3. This condition wil l be included in the budget 
constraint of each consume r . 
Preliminary arra ngemen t s f o r t he ta x equil i b rium model 
are so fa r done . The conditions f o r the equilibrium with 
taxes are same as those for t h e no-tax model : 1) demand 
equals supply in inputs , 2) d emand equals supply in ou tputs , 
and 3) zero profit conditions hold in both industries. v alues 
of the parameters a nd exogenous variabl e s are assumed to be 
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same as given in Table 1. The full ar ra ys of the equations 
are shown in Appendix (of course, they are same as the no - tax 
equilibrium equations when the tax rates are all zero) . 
The tax programs considered are (tax rates are 
arbitrarily chosen) : 
1. 
2 . 
3 . 
tax program 1; 
only . 
tax program 2; 
secto r s . 
tax program 3; 
both sectors. 
50% tax on capita l income in sector 1 
50% tax on capital income in both 
50% tax on all factor income in 
The new equilibrium solutions corresponding to the above 
schemes are shown in Tables 3 , 4, a nd ~ . I will compa re each 
of the solutions with the no-tax equilibrium in Table 2. 
From Table 3 , which shows the re sults of the tax program 
1, we see that the 50% tax on capital income in sector 1 
causes the net-of-tax return on capita l to fall . Capi tal 
employment in sector 1 falls , while that in secto r 2 rises. 
Because this tax is avoidable through factor mob ility, capital 
intensity in sector 1 naturally fal ls while that of sector ?. 
rises because of the decli ne in the ne t rental rate on 
capital . Less manufactu ring, and more nonmanufacturing 
ou tput, is produced be ca use of the tax . price of the 
ma nufacturing output, therefore, increases, and that of 
nonmanufacturing o ne decreases . The incomes of the poor 
increase wh i le the o ther two consumers' incomes decrease even 
2S 
Table 3. Equilibrium Solution for General Equilib r ium 
Model with 50% Tax on Manufacturing Capital 
(M : Manufacturing , N: Nonmanufacturing) 
Equilibrium Prices 
Pl= .780 P2 = . S9S Pk = • ·us Pw = 1. rm 0 
Production 
Net 
Capital Tax 
Quantity Revenue Capital Cost Paid 
M 31 . Sl59 24 . 1129 44 . lilS3 9 . 1)~/. 4 . 751 
N 4CL331 24.0!05 25 . 947 S . 597 0 . 000 
Total 48 . f.)34 7rl . 0vHl ls . 0q9 <1 . 7 51 
Total 
Capital 
Cost 
14 . ?.S1 
5. sen 
lq . qsoi 
Labor Total Per-Unit Capital 
Labor 
M 10.3715 
N 18 . 408 
Total 28 • 7 8 4 
Demands 
The Rich 
The Nliddle 
The Poor 
Total 
M 
9 . 725 
11.613 
10 . 231 
31.5159 
Cost 
10 . 37&) 
18 . 408 
28 . 784 
N 
l~ .7 09 
10.568 
13.0S4 
40 . 331 
Cost Cost Intensity 
211 . 629 .780 4 . ?.4f1 
24 . rrns • c;q 5 1 . 410 
4q . 634 
Ex pen - Labor Labo r 
diture Hours Income 
17 . 532 e; . 243 ') . 243 
15.350 q _452 C) .4 S2 
15 .71) 2 l3 . 0A9 i3 . r.rn9 
48 • .;34 28.784 28 • 7 A 4 
Capital Total 
The Rich 
The Middle 
The Poor 
Total 
Income 
9 . 70() 
4.314 
1 . 079 
15. 099 
Transfers 
1.1)83 
l . S84 
1.584 
4.71)1 
Income Utility 
17.532 4 ~ . lil79 
15 . 350 35.841 
15 . 752 33 . 4~4 
48 . 1134 
--------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 4. Equilibrium So lution for General Equilib r ium Model 
with a 50% Tax on Capital Income in Manufactu ri ng and 
Nonmanufacturing Industries 
(M : Manufacturing , N: Nonmanu fa c turing) 
Equilibrium Prices 
Pl = . 755 P2 = . ()49 Pw = 1 . r.,crn 
Pr od uction 
Net Total 
Capi tal Tax Capital 
Quantity Revenue Capi tal Cost Paid Cos t 
M 33 .71)4 2'1 . 479 49 . 389 l fil . !il')4 5 . i;, 33 15 . rl97 
N 3fi . 517 23 . 707 20 . fill 4 . 200 7. . 10! 0 'i . 30~ 
Total 49 . 18<1 10 . ,.,<rn 14 . 2114 7 .133 21.397 
Labor To tal Per -unit Capital 
Labor Cost Cost Cost Intensity 
M HL382 10 . 382 25 . 479 
N 17 . 407 17 . 407 23 . 707 
Total 27 . 789 27 . 789 49 . 186 
Demand 
The Rich 
The Middle 
The Poor 
To tal 
The Ri ch 
The Middle 
The Poo r 
Total 
M 
10 . '143 
12 . 305 
10 . Alt; 
33 . 7()4 
Capita l 
Income 
Cl . 170 
4 . 075 
l . 'H9 
14 . 21)4 
Ex pen-
N di tu r e 
14 . 379 17 . 3f)e) 
9 . 753 ll) . fil7 
i2.19e; 111 . 203 
3fi . 517 4q . 1ae; 
Transfers 
?. • 3 7 7 
2 . 378 
2 . 378 
7.133 
• 7 55 4 . 757 
. e;4Q 1 . 184 
Labor Labo r 
Hours Income 
5 . 819 5 . Rlq 
q . 1e;4 q . 1r,4 
12 . B0'1 l?. . A0'i 
?.7 . 789 27 . 78q 
Total 
Income Uti lity 
17 . 31,(.) 41 . 70!1 
15.1)17 3'1 . 214 
lcS . ?.03 33 . ~78 
4q . l8fi 
--------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 5 . Equilibrium for General Equilibrium Model with 
50% Tax on Capital and Labo r Income in Manufacturing 
and Nonmanufacturing Industries 
(M: Manufactu ring, N: Nonmanufactur ing) 
Equ ilibrium Prices 
Pl = . 951 P2 = .908 Pk= . 231 PW = 1 . (.J (.ll 0 
Production 
Net 
Capital Tax 
Quantity Reve nue Ca p i ta 1 Cost Paid 
M 29 . 329 27 . 885 52 . 8(.)'i 12 . 2?.7 11 . 114 
N 27 . 351 24 . 824 17 . 134 3 . 9n3 1 . 981 
Total 52 . 709 10.rrnei lfi . 190 8 . 095 
Net Total Per -
La bo r Tax Labor Tota l Unit 
Labor Cost Paid Cos t Cost Cost 
M f) . 3(:)3 '1.31-)3 3 . 181 9 . 544 27 . 885 • g 51 
N 12.587 12.587 f) • 29 3 18 . 880 24 . 8 24 . 908 
Total 18 . 950 18 .9 5'1 9 . 474 28 . 4~4 5?..709 
Demands 
Ex pen - Labor 
M N d iture Hours 
8 . 'i43 9 . 484 111 . 8 2.:; . 5'1?. The Rich 
The Middle 
The Poor 
10 . 906 7 . r.;70 17 . 330 'i . 848 
Total 
The Rich 
The Middle 
The Poor 
To tal 
9 . 780 HL197 
29 • 3 29 27 .351 
Capital 
Income 
10 . 408 
4.6215 
l.lS'i 
l'i .1 90 
lR.553 11.540 
52 . 7Pl9 18 . 950 
Total 
Transfer I nc ome 
5 . 85'1 lr::) . A2n 
5. 8S'i 17 . 330 
5 . 857 18 . 553 
17 . 5'i9 '12 . 709 
Total 
Capital 
Cost 
18 . 341 
5 . 944 
24 . ?.R5 
Capital 
Intensity 
8 . 309 
l . 3t=il 
Labo r 
Income 
• 5 e:; 2 
'1 . ~4R 
11.540 
18 . 950 
Utility 
41 . srn 
35 . n98 
32 . 413 
--------------------------------------------------------------
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though the labor supply of the poo r falls , while t hat of the 
rich and middle rises , increasing the t o tal labor supply. The 
util ity of the rich falls wh i l e that of t he middle and poor 
rises. Details about welfare changes will be discussed in the 
next section. 
The equilibrium solution f o r t he t ax prog ram 2 is shown 
in Table 4. Since the 50% tax is levied on cap ital income in 
both sectors, t his tax can no t be avoided t h r o ug h shifting 
capital between secto r s . Naturally , the net-o f - tax p rice of 
capital falls , though the gross cos t o f capital to firms is 
essentially unchanged (it inc reases from 0 . 3rt4 to 0 . 30') , 
measured in labo r units). Over a ll, the t ax - since it is on a 
facto r in fixed s upply - affects resou r ce allocation on ly 
because it r ed i s tri b utes inco me and because consume r s have 
diffe r en t p refer ences . Because of the tax , capital a nd labor 
empl o yment in secto r 1 s lightly increa s e while i n sector 2 
la bor empl oyment inc reases and capital employment decreases. 
S ince g r oss capital cost ri ses in both secto rs , capital 
intensity falls, so the tax leads t o a less cap ital intensive 
method of production in bo th industries . The relative price 
of manufacturing to nonma nufacturing ou tput is barely changed , 
lead ing t o littl e change in p r od uc ti o n of outputs . The 
incomes of the rich fall , while the midd le a nd poo r inc rea se 
their expendit ures. The labor supply of the ric h inc reases , 
a nd that of the middle and poo r decreases . The util i ty o f the 
r ich falls , while that o f the middle and poor rises beca use of 
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the income redistribution effects of the tax. 
Table 5 shows the results of the tax program 3 , the 511% 
tax on labor and capital income in both sectors. The tax on 
cap i tal, which is unavoidable , affects r esource allocation 
only through its impact on the income distribution; however, 
the tax on labor income could be avo ided by reducing the 
supply of labor hours . As we see from Table 5 , the tax 
increases the relative price of labor (since labo r supply 
shrinks) , causing both sec tors to adopt more capital intensive 
production techniques. Ove rall , labor employment in both 
sectors falls, while capital employment rises in sector 1 
( fa 1 1 s i n sec t o r 2) • The ta x on 1 a bo r i n come , w h i ch d i st o r ts 
the supply of labor, causes production of both o utputs to 
decrease . The incomes of the ri ch fall, and those o f the 
middle and poor ri se ; the labor s upply of each group falls 
because of the labor tax . Th e utility of the rich and middle 
falls , while that of the poor rises. 
D. Welfare Measures of the Gain or Loss 
Policy appraisal using this so rt of technique usually 
r e lies upon a comparison between an existing equilibrium and a 
counterfactual equilibrium computed with modified policies 
(i.e., with changed tax programs). For numerical welfare 
measures of the gain o r loss , cvs and EVs are widely employed . 
The CV is defined as the amount of in come we can take away 
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from , or give to , an individual after an economic c hange , 
while leaving him as well off as he was before it . The EV is 
de f ined as the amount of income we wo uld need to give to or 
take from an individual , if an economic change did not happen , 
to make him as we l l off as if it did . 
A rea sonable measure to adopt is the money metric utility 
function (i.e., the expenditure function) . The expenditu r e 
function , E(q ; p , I) , which is defined as e(q , v(p ,I )) , where 
v(p ,I} is the indirect utility , measu res how much income the 
consumer woul d need at p rice s q to be as well off as he o r she 
would be facing price s p a nd having income I [26; p . 2~4 ] . By 
using the expenditure funct i on , cvs and Evs can b e shown in 
mathematical f o rms as foll ows: 
(22) 
( 2 3) 
EV = E (po ; p ' , I ' ) 
CV= E(p ';p ', I') 
E(po ; po , I o) = E(po ; p ', I ' ) - Io 
E( p';p 0 , I 0 ) = I ' - E( p '; p 0 , r 0 ) , 
where the supe r script o f "o " and "'" indica tes the old prices 
and income , and the new (at the p r o posed proj ect ) prices and 
income , respect i vely . As seen fr om the above two equations , 
the EV is the difference be tween the o 1 d income an d the 
income , a t o ld pri ces , r equired t o r each the new util ity. The 
CV is the differenc e be tween the new income and t he income , at 
new prices , required to r each the o l d utility . The CV and EV 
have t he same sign as the d irecti o n of the change in welfare: 
for a welfare l o ss, bo t h a r e negati ve . Altho ugh the CV seems 
reasonable f o r some compensation scheme at the new prices, the 
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EV is better fo r measuring the "willing ness to pay" (?.'1 ; p . 
265). There are two reasons f o r this . First , the EV measures 
the income change at current prices and it is much easier for 
decision makers to judge the value o f a dollar at current 
prices than at some hypothetical prices. Second , if we are 
comparing more than one proposed policy change , t he CV keeps 
changing the base prices while the EV keeps the base prices 
fixed at the old p rices. Thus , the EV is mor e suitable for 
compa r iso ns among v ari ous tax programs. 
For measuring the welfare change fur the economy as a 
whole , the welfare costs of the tax bei ng considered a re 
measured by aggregating the cvs or EVs across the individuals. 
The sum of EVs is a more e asily interpreted measure because 
old incomes and prices are used and a re t ypical l y the same i n 
the sequence of pairwise comparisons [9 ] . This is also 
supported b y the second re aso n o f the superi o rit y of the EV t o 
the CV. 
In calculating the cvs and EVs in practice, t h e 
expenditure function is obtained as below by i nve rti ng the 
indirect utility functi on , which is de rived by substituting 
(14), (15) , and (16) into (9) o n the page 16 - l B: 
(24) Ij = Vj (aljPll-sj + a 2jP2l-sj + a3jPwl - sj) 1/(1 - sj) 
Therefore , the CV and EV in (22) and ( 23) b ecome 
(25) CVjh = I jh - Vj ~( al j Plhl-sj + a2jP 2h l - sj 
+ a3jPwhl - s j ) 1/(1 - sj ) 
32 
(26) EVjh = Vjh(aljP101 - sj + a2jP20l-sj + a3jPwAl - sj)l/(l-s j) 
- IjCi, 
where 
0 : values at the no - tax equilibrium , 
j : consume r s l , 2 , and 3 , 
h : values at the tax prog r ams 1 , 2 , and 3 . 
Table fl shows the values of the cvs and EVs comparing the 
no - tax equilib ri um price with each of equilibrium prices of 
three tax programs . 
Table ~ . Welfare Measure of Impacts of Three Tax Prog rams 
Tax Pr ogram 1 Tax Program 2 Tax Prog r am 3 
EV CV EV CV EV CV 
The Rich -1 . 855 -1. 827 - 2 . 177 - 2 . 180 - 2 . 347 - 2 . t)74 
The Middle • OJ 21 • OJ 21 . 334 . 335 - • OJ99 - . 114 
The Poor 1 . 524 l . SOJ3 1 . 843 l . A45 • i:; 5 9 . 781 
Total - . 310 - . 303 A. crno ~ .~CH~ -1.787 - ?. . OJOJ7 
As seen from the Table ~ , at the tax program 1 , the rich 
become wo r s e o f f and th e m i d d 1 e and po o r be t t e r o f f , 1 ea v i n g 
the economy "as a whole" worse off . At new prices due to the 
50% tax on capital in come in sector 1 , we must give the rich 
1.827 more units of income at new incomes to compensate them 
for a price change such that ut ility is unchanged , while the 
middle and poor are willing to pay 0 . 0J21 and l . 5R3 units of 
income from the new incomes fo r the pre - tax satisfaction . 
These income changes would be necessary to co mpensate the 
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consumers f o r the price change. Meanwhile, at old prices 
(i.e . , at no-tax equilibrium prices) , the old income minus 
1.855 units is needed to r each the new utility for the rich 
while 0.021 (and 1.524) more units of income at the o ld 
incomes wi 11 make the middle (and the poor) reach the new 
utility in t his tax system. These income changes at the new 
prices wo uld be equivalent to the proposed change . 
At the tax program 2 , comparing no - tax equilibrium to 
equilibrium with 50% tax on capital income in both sectors , 
the economy as a whole does not expe r ience any welfare change 
because the tax is non - distortiona ry, even though the ri ch 
become worse off and the middle and poor better off . At new 
prices due to the taxes , we must give the rich 2.18~ units of 
income at current incomes to compensate f o r a price change 
such that utility is unchanged , while the middle and poo r are 
willing to pay 0 . 335 and 1.845 units of income from the 
current incomes to achieve no-tax utility. Meanwhile , at old 
prices (i.e . , at no-tax equilib r ium prices) , the old income 
minus 2. 177 units is needed to reach the new utility for the 
ri ch while ~ . 334 (and 1.843) more units of income at the old 
incomes wi 11 make the middle (and the poo r) reach the new 
utility. 
At the tax program 3 , 50 % t ax on la bor and capital income 
in both sectors , the economy as a whole becomes worse off even 
tho ugh the poor improve their welfare and the ri ch and middle 
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become worse off. At new prices due to the taxes , we must 
give the rich and middle 2 . ~74 and 0 .114 units of income at 
current incomes and we can take ~.781 units of income away 
from the old income of the poor to compensate f o r a price 
change such that utility is unchanged . Meanwhile , at old 
prices (i.e., at no-tax equilibrium prices), the old incomes 
of the rich and middle minus 2.347 and 0 . 099 units is require d 
to reach the new utility for them, while ~ - ~59 more units of 
income at the old incomes will make the middle reach the new 
utility . 
What must be emphasized once again is that the EV 
measures the income change at current prices, so we can judge 
the value of a dollar at curre nt p ri ces and the EV uses the 
status-quo prices (Le. , no-tax equilibrium prices) as the 
base for every comparisons with prices of each of three tax 
programs. Thus, the sum of EVs is a more easily interpreted 
measure for the economy as a whole . With this concept of the 
sum of Evs , the economy as a whole in the tax p r og ram 1 and 3 
decreases 0 . 31 and 1.787 units of income from the old one (at 
no-tax equilibrium) t o reach the new utility whatever the 
levels of each consumer group' s utility are, while the tax 
program 2 keeps the same income at the current prices as the 
o ld income . Caution, however, follows in interpreting the 
welfare change of the economy as a whole: each utility of the 
three consumers at the changed utility possibility frontiers 
can not be said Pareto supe ri o rity o r inferiority to t he 
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utility at the old utility possibility frontiers of the no-tax 
model. 
3 (j 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The AGEA converts the Walrasian general equilibrium 
structure from an abstract representation of an economy into 
realistic models of actual economies. Techniques developed by 
it calculate not only equilibrium prices with and without 
taxes an d associated levels of produc tion, but also the tax 
revenues to evaluate policy options . 
I simulate a tax model of the AGEA. I take the two 
secto r, two factor , and three consumer mode l with the labor-
leisure choice. Pr od uction of each good takes place acco r ding 
to a CRS CES producti o n functi on and uti 1 i ty is a form of a 
CES function. Factor demands are derived from cost 
minimization, while co mmod ity demands fr o m utility 
maximization subject t o the budget co nstra int. The model 
satisfies three equilibrium conditions , which provi d e 
solutions of general equilibria with and without tax by a 
computer package. 
Three tax programs are considered . When 50% tax on 
capital income in the manufacturing industry is levied, the 
net-o f-tax price of capital fa lls. Si nce the gross-o f-tax 
price of capital in secto r 1 inc reases compared to the no-tax 
model, capital intensity of sector 1 falls while that of 
sector 2 rises. Less manufacturing and more nonmanufactu ring 
output is produced, and the relative price of manufacturing 
to nonmanufacturing output rises. Incomes of the poor 
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increase and those of the other two decrease , while the labor 
supply of the poor falls and that of the rich and middle 
rises. The rich become worse off and the midd le and poor 
better off because of this tax . For the rich to reach the new 
utility, the old income minus 1.855 is r equired wh ile c;1 . fiPl 
(1 .524) more units of income at old incomes makes the middle 
(poo r ) reach t h e new uti 1 i ty. 
When 50% tax on capital income in both sectors is levied , 
both indust ries can not escape this tax . Capital intensity in 
both sectors falls very slightly because the gross - of- tax 
price of capital increases from ~ . 304 to i;, . J~f:> , leading to a 
less capital intensive method of production in both 
industries. This very marginal change is at large due to the 
r edistribution of income. The relative price of manufacturing 
to nonmanufacturing output and production levels of both 
sectors are little changed . The incomes of the rich fall 
while those o f the middle and poor rise , and the labor supply 
o f the r i ch i n c re a s es and th a t o f the mid d 1 e and po o r 
decreases because of the income effect o f the transfer . The 
rich become wo r se off and the middle and poor better o ff . At 
no-tax equilibrium prices, the old incomes of the rich minus 
2. 177 is required t o reach the new utility while 0 . 334 (l.843) 
more units of income at the old incomes will make the mi ddle 
(poo r) rea ch the new utility. 
Neither i ndustry can avoid the 5Vl% tax on labor and 
capital income in both secto r s . Since relative price of 
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capital t o labor falls, both sectors use more cap ital 
i ntens ive method of production, empl oy ing more capital and 
less labor in sec t o r 1 and less capital and labo r i n secto r 2. 
The relati ve price of manufacturing to nonmanufacturing o utput 
falls. The labor supply is dis t orted and r educed beca use of 
the labor tax , causing p r oduct i on of both outpu ts to decrease . 
The incomes o f the ri ch fall and those of the middle a nd poo r 
ri se with a decrease of la bo r s uppl y of every consumer . The 
r i ch and mid d 1 e become worse of f and the poor better off i n 
this tax system unlike the othe r two . At no-tax equilibr ium 
p ri ces , the o ld incomes of th e ri ch and middle mi nus 2. 347 a nd 
0 .A99 units a r e requir ed t o re ach the new utility , while A . ~59 
more units of income at the o l d income will make the poor 
reach the new utili ty . 
Although tax programs 1 and 3 make the economy as a whole 
wo r s e off , and tax program 2 is neut r al based o n that the sum 
of EVs is a mo r e eas il y interpreted measure because o l d 
incomes a nd p r ices are used , the utility of three consumer s 
ca n no t be said Pa r eto superio ri ty or inferio ri ty at the 
c han ged utility poss ibility f r on tier i n inte r p reting the 
welfare of the econo my as a whole. Thi s is beca use t a xes in 
tax programs 1 and 3 are distortionary , and those i n t a x 
program 2 a r e non-d isto r t i ona r y . 
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VIII . APP ENDI X: EQUILIBR I UM CONDITI ONS FOR FACTOR TAXES 
Whe n a fac t o r t ax is imposed , ma r g ina l p r od uct of a facto r 
eq ua l s t he g r oss - o f - t ax income of its f ac t o r . Thus , MRTS 
be tween c a p ital and labo r i n each s e c t o r i s equal t o the r at i o 
of the g r o s s - o f - ta x i ncome of labo r to that of capital : 
oQi 
o Li bi Li - 1/ ci 
= (- -- ~ - ~) 
l - b1 Kl 
Pw(l+tli) 
= ---------
oQ i Pk(l+tki) 
oK i 
whe r e 
Qi : production functi o ns given in (1) on p . 15 , 
t li : ad vale r orn tax rate o n labo r income i n the 
sector i , 
tki : ad vale r o m tax rate on c apital income in the 
secto r i , 
Pw : net - of-tax p r ice o f labor , 
Pk : net - of - tax pr i ce o f capital , and 
definitions o f othe r notati ons are s ame as in no - tax 
equilib r ium and r esults . 
This gives us the following : 
(Al) 
Ki 1-bi 
Li =(-~i -
( l +t li )PW ci 
--------- ) 
(l + tki) Pk · 
Ki 
( A 2 ) ki = 
Li 
wi l l be defined as t h e cap i tal intensity as 
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b efo r e . 
From the production funct i ons , (Al) , and (A2) , the 
facto r demand functi o ns become 
l 
(A3) Li = --Qi[bi 
ai 
bi (l+tki) Pk (1-ci) 
( ) 
ci /(1 - ci) + (1-bi) - - -- ------ - -- 1 
1- bi ( l+tl i) PW 
1 1-bi (l+tli) PW (1 - ci) 
(A4) Ki= ~iQ i [bi(-bl- (~~~kl) ~k) + (1 - bi)l ci /( 1- ci) 
Meanwhile, the t o tal cost functions o f each sector 
become 
(l+tki) Pk Ki 
(AS) TC i = (l+tli)PwLi[l + ------- - - ] 
(Ac;) 
(l+tli) PW Li 
Plugging (A2) and (A3) into (AS) gives 
TCi = ~-Qi (bi) ci/ ( 1- ci) [ { ( l+tl i) Pw} ( 1-ci) 
ai 
1-bi ci 
+(-bf-) {(l+tki)Pk}(l-ci)] 1/(1- ci) 
The marginal cost derived from (Afi) equals the p r ice of 
o utput o f each sector: 
(A7) Pi = =-(bi)ci/(1-ci) ({ (l+tli) Pw} (1 - ci) 
ai 
1 - b i c i 
+(-bf-) {(l+tki)Pk}(l- ci)] 1/(1-ci) 
The CES utility functions are same as before : 
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uj = [aijl/sjxlj(sj-1)/sj + a 2jl/sjx2j(sj-l)/sj 
+ a3j l / sjRj (sj-1) / sj 1 sj / (sj - 1) 
Since I assume all government revenues are evenly 
redistributed to consumers, the budget constraint of each 
consumer contains a share of the t otal tax revenue , T/3 . Each 
of tax revenues from the tax rates levied on factor incomes in 
both sectors is denoted as Ti; that is , 
Tl = tkl*Pk* Kl , 
T2 = tll*Pw*Ll , 
T3 = tk2*Pk*K 2 , and 
T4 = tl 2*Pw* L2 . 
The total tax revenue , T, is a sum of the above Tl, T2 , 
T3 , and T4 . Thus, the budget constraint o f each consume r 
becomes 
(AS) Ij ' = PkWkj + 24Pw + T/3 => PlXlj + P2X2j + PwRj 
By the first-order conditions of the utility maximization 
subject to t he budget co nstraint (AB) , we have the following 
commodity and leisure demand functions : 
alj I j I 
(A9) Xlj = 
Plsj Dj 
a2j I j I 
X2j = , and 
P2sj Dj 
(Al 0) 
a3j I j I 
Rj = 
Pwsj Dj 
(Al 1) 
where 
Dj = aljPl(l-sj) + a2jP2(l - sj) + a3jPw(l - sj) and 
Ij ' = PkWkj + 24PW + T/3 . 
The three equilibrium conditions for the tax model are same 
as t hose for the no - tax mode l : 
1 . demand equals supply in inputs 
(Al2) L l + L2 = 72 - Rl - R2 - R3 
(Al3) klLl + k2L2 = k (k is the total market endowment of 
cap ital) 
where Ll, L2 , kl, and k2 are given by (A 2) and (A3) , 
2 . demand equals supply in o utputs 
(Al4) Xll + Xl2 + Xl3 = Ql 
(Al5) X21 + X2 2 + X23 = Q/. 
where Xli and X2i are given by (A9) and (AlA) 
3 . ze ro profit conditions hold 
1 
(Alt;) Pl= --(bl) c l /(l -cl)({(l+tll)Pw}(l-cl ) 
(Al7) 
al 
1-bl c 1 
+(----) {(l+tkl)Pk}l-cll 1/(1- cl) 
bl 
1 
P2 = --(b 2)c 2/0-c 2 ) [{ (l+tl 2) Pw} (l-c 2 ) 
a2 
l-b 2 c 2 
+(--- - ) {(l+tk 2 )Pk}l- c21 l/(l-c2) 
\ b2 
With the same parameter values as the n o -tax model , the 
solution to this tax model is c haracterized by 22 variables , 
the four prices , Pl , P2 , Pw , and Pk , nine demand quantities , 
Xll , X21 , Rl , Xl2 , X22 , R2 , Xl3 , X23 , and R3, two labor and 
capital inputs , Ll, L2 , Kl , and K~ , two capital intensities , 
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kl and k2 , and five tax revenues, Tl , T2, T3 , T4, and T . 
The no - tax model is same as all tax rates being zero in 
this tax model. At the tax program 1 , tkl = 0.5 , and tll = 
tk 2 = tl 2 = 0 . At tax p r ogram 2 , tkl = tk2 = 0 . 5 , a n d tl 1 = 
tl2 = 0. At tax program 3 , tkl = tk2 = tll = tl2 = 0 . 5 . 
